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fore the "control" language may not be interpreted as excluding propos-

als dealing with the racial policies of countries in which the issuer is
investing.

Despite the ambiguities in the new rule, it can probably be said that
it was intended to represent a liberalization of the political and social
exclusion of shareholder proposals. Aside from the question of whether
the SEC should have moved in this direction at all," the changes seem
to fall short of supplying a truly objective, workable guideline. It appears probable that, for the time being, the battle will shift from questions of whether a particular proposal stems from improper motives of
the shareholder or whether such improper motives dominate his intentions to questions of whether the proposal is "significantly related to the
business of the issuer" or whether it is "within the issuer's control."
CHARLES

E.

MURPHY, JR.

Securities Regulation-Rule 10b-5-An Alternative to Scalping Palefaces Who Speak with Forked Tongues
To implement section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,1 the Securities and Exchange Commission fashioned rule lOb-5,2
which has become an expanding source of litigation for securities viola'Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of ,mymeans
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
'The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971).
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tions. Although neither section 10(b) of the Exchange Act nor rule lOb5 specifically provide for the initiation of private causes of action, the
federal judiciary has interpreted the rule to afford a remedy for persons
injured as a result of a lOb-5 violation.3 In addition to a flexible construction of rule lb-5 permitting civil suits to be maintained by private
individuals, many courts have begun to relax some of the restrictive
elements of lOb-5 causes of action,4 which often resulted in dismissals
because of the plaintiffs' failure to state a claim.5 Consequently, more
plaintiffs suing under rule 10b-5 have been able to survive defense motions for directed verdicts and thereby enhance their prospects for favorable judgments. The remedies for violation of rule lOb-5 are not specified in the Exchange Act nor under rule lOb-5, so the courts have been
faced with the problem of devising remedies for defrauded plaintiffs. In
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,' the United States Supreme
Court has solved part of the problem by formulating a rule on the issue
of compensatory damages to private party sellers.' This note will examine the alternative measures of damages that were available to the Court
in arriving at a damage rule and will evaluate the Court's selection of a
damage rule.
The Affiliated Ute case was initiated by mixed-blood Ute Indians'
who sought damages against the United States, the First Security Bank
of Utah, and two assistant managers of the bank for alleged violation
of rule lOb-5. Under a plan formulated by the mixed-blood Utes for the
distribution of assets to the individual members of their group, the Ute
Distribution Corporation (UDC) was formed specifically to manage
'The right to maintain a private action was initially recognized in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947). The United States Supreme Court recognized the
right in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers' Life & Cas. Co., 92 S. Ct. 165, 169 (1971).

'Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 92 S. Ct. 1456, 1472 (1972) (adoption of broad
definition for materiality of mistatement and elimination of requirement of positive proof of

reliance when there is a failure to disclose by one possessing such an affirmative duty); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) (liberal construction of "in connection
with" clause of rule lOb-5(c)); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242, 249 (6th
Cir. 1962)(abandonment of privity requirement).
'See, e.g., Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786, 790 (S.D.W. Va. 1954), appeal dismissed, 222
F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1955); Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), affd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
£92 S. Ct. 1456 (1972).
'Although rule lob-5 applies to defrauded purchasers as well as to defrauded sellers, it is in
the latter area that the Court has ruled on the damage issue. The scope of this note will be confined
to lob-5 actions brought by plaintiff sellers.
8

The plaintiffs initiated the action, Reyos v. UnitedStates, in the United States District Court

for the District of Utah, Central Division. Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1970).
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mineral rights and unadjudicated claims against the United States under
the Ute Partition Act.' UDC issued ten shares of its capital stock in the
name of each mixed-blood Ute, a total of 4900 shares. The assistant
managers of the bank, retained as transfer agent for UDC, had developed and encouraged a market in the stock, but they failed to inform
the plaintiff sellers that their shares were selling for a higher price in
the market and that the managers were in a position to gain financially
from the plaintiffs' sales. After a reversal by the Tenth Circuit'" of a
generous award by the district court, the plaintiff Indians were granted
a writ of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court."
In its decision,' 2 the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's refusal to
award damages under the Tort Claims Act, since the government was
under no duty to the plaintiffs. 3 However, the Court held that the
managers' acts were clearly within the scope of rule lOb-5' 4 and that the
bank's liability was coextensive with that of the assistant managers."
Liability was predicated upon a relaxation of the requirement of positive
proof of reliance. 6 Recognizing the right of the plaintiffs to recover
under rule lOb-5, the Court turned to the damage issue 7 and made its
first ruling on damages in a private action under rule lOb-5.
One recovery award available to private party sellers is rescission
or damages equivalent to rescission. By rescinding the transaction, the
defrauded seller would be made whole by a recovery of the securities
which were sold as a result of the defendant's misrepresentation or
failure to disclose." By recovering damages equivalent to rescission, the
defrauded seller would be awarded the securities' current value at the
time judgment is rendered upon tender of the sale price.
9§ 10, 25 U.S.C. § 677i (1970).

' 0Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1970).
"Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 402 U.S. 905 (1971). The Reyos case was consolidated with another case, which centered on the Ute Partition Act, because of the issues for Indians
whose federal supervision was in the course of termination. 92 S. Ct. at 1466.
"2Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 92 S. Ct. 1456 (1972).
3
Id. at 1470. The Court reasoned that, since there was no governmental authority over the

shares of UDC stock, there could be no liability on the part of the United States for failure to
restrain a sale of the stock. Each mixed-blood could sell his shares as he wished and to whom he
pleased, subject only to restrictions imposed by UDC's own articles.
"Id. at 1472.
'sld.
"Id.
7

1 1d.

"Most lob-5 cases turn on some material misrepresentation or on some failure to disclose.
Even in cases which do not turn on misrepresentation or omission, these elements are almost
invariably present. 2 A. BROMBERG, SEcURITIEs LAW: FRAUD § 8.2 (1971).
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When the securities which the plaintiff was fraudulently induced to
sell can be returned by the defendant at the same value at which the
plaintiff sold the securities, both the fraudulent and defrauded parties
can be returned to the status quo ante. However, the fair value of the
securities at the time of the sale may have been greater than the value
of the securities at the time of judgment, and the plaintiff would be in
no better position after rescission than he enjoyed after the fraudulent
conduct. For example, if defendant's fraudulent conduct induced the
plaintiff to sell Security X at ten dollars per share when Security X
would have been selling at fifteen dollars per share in the absence of
defendant's fraud, and if Security X were selling at ten dollars per share
at the time the judgment is rendered, rescission would return the parties
to the status quo ante but would deprive the plaintiff of the value he
should have received for his sale. In such a case, the injury to the
plaintiff would not be rectified by rescission. The same is true when the
value of the securities has fallen below the value at which the plaintiff
sold. Indeed, rescission would then constitute a further injury to the
plaintiff. Only when the current value of the securities is greater than
the value at the time of the fraudulent transaction is rescission an attractive remedy to a lOb-5 plaintiff, since it affords the plaintiff a significant
speculative advantage during the period within which an action might
be brought.
Authority for allowing rescission in a lOb-5 cause of action is limited. In Parker v. Baltimore Paint & Chemical Corp.,:'the court indi-

cated that rescission was an available remedy so long as the plaintiff
offered restoration of the consideration he received unless no consideration was received or unless the consideration received was worthless.
However, the plaintiffs failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted precluded such relief in that action. Lanza v. Drexel & Co."0
is also indicative of a court's willingness to allow rescission in a lOb-5
cause of action. The court held that sellers of stock who were deceived
by the buyers were entitled to rescind the transaction.
When rescission is impossible because the defendant has resold the
securities to an innocent third party, an economic equivalent of rescission affords a comparable remedy.2' A modification of this damage
19244 F. Supp. 267, 270 (D. Colo. 1965).
11[1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,826 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
"Ifthe securities involved in the fraudulent transaction are traded on an open market and are
readily accessible, the plaintiff can repurchase the securities and thereby effectively achieve rescission. If the securities involved in the fraudulent transaction are not accessible, the plaintiff must
be satisfied with his damages.
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formula was applied in Janigan v. Taylor,2 2 in which the court awarded
to the plaintiff the defendant's profit realized as the proximate consequence of the fraud 23 even though resale of the securities was not
planned at the time of the fraudulent purchase. The court did not go so
far as to suggest that the defendant would be liable for a subsequent
appreciation in value after his sale to an innocent third party,24 which
would effectively give the plaintiff a "call" on the shares at the sale price
until the statute of limitations has run against him 2. 5 In this respect, the
Janiganaward is distinguishable from the "call" which would be created
by an economic equivalent of rescission.
The situations in which a plaintiff might request rescission in a l Ob5 cause of action are limited, since an award of damages might be a
more attractive alternative, as noted above, and since the defendant in
a lOb-5 action need not have purchased the securities to be liable under
the rule.26 Furthermore, a suit for rescission is subject to the equitable
defenses of laches, estoppel, and waiver.27 Additionally, rescission may
subject a defendant to unwarranted liability in view of the relaxation of
the elements of a lOb-5 cause of action, 21 and rescission gives to the
plaintiff a speculative advantage he would not have enjoyed had he not
sold the securities as a result of the fraud.
The most common judicial methods used to formulate lob-5
awards for private party sellers 29 have been the cover theory and the outof-pocket theory. The cover theory results in an award representing the
difference between the sale price of the stock and the amount necessary
to repurchase (cover) the stock within a reasonable time after the seller
has become charged with notice of the true facts about the stock. 0
Under the out-of-pocket theory, the plaintiff is awarded the difference
between the price he received and the real or actual value of the stock
2344 F.2d 781 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). See also Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955), affd with modification as to interest, 235 F.2d 369 (3d
Cir. 1956); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
23344 F.2d at 786.
21
See note 21 supra.
2'W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 121 (1968).
2
1n the Affliated Ute case, the defendants' personal purchases comprised only 8 1/3% of the
fraudulent sales. 92 S. Ct. at 1472.
"See, e.g., Royal Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1962); Walpert v. Bart,
280 F. Supp. 1006, 1017 (D. Md. 1967).
21See note 4 supra.
2
'Defrauded buyers who have prevailed on the merits have typically recovered their purchase
price on a rescission measure of damages or under an out-of-pocket rule. 2 A. BRONIBERG, supra
note 18, § 9.1.
uMyzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 746 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
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at the date of sale.3 ' Both theories of recovery have been employed
extensively with jurisdictional variations.
The historical development of the cover theory as a measure of
damages began with the application of what has become known as the
New York Rule. 2 The United States Supreme Court adopted the New
York Rule in Galligher v. Jones33 in which the Court set the true and
just measure of damages at the highest intermediate value of the stock
between the time of conversion and a reasonable time after the owner
of the stock received sufficient notice of the conversion to enable him
to replace the stock.3 4 The cover theory has subsequently been applied
to 10b-5 actions, such as Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 5 The
trial court applied the New York Rule to arrive at a damage formula
based on the average of the highest daily price of the stock for twenty
trading days after the misleading statement had been corrected." The
average which the court adopted as the measure of damages was 50.75
dollars per share. The appellate court assessed the damages under the
cover theory at fifty-nine dollars per share by calculating the highest
value of the stock between the time disclosure was sufficient for a reasonable and diligent investor to be informed of the correction and a
reasonable time thereafter during which the investor had an opportunity
to decide whether or not to reinvest.3 Both the district and appellate
courts attempted by their formulations to put the injured plaintiffs in
the position they would have enjoyed 3if they had not sold at the time of
the defendant's misleading statement. 1
An award based on the cover theory may be arbitrarily discriminatory in litigation arising out of a factual setting similar to Texas Gulf
in which there are multiple plaintiffs. A wealthy plaintiff with surplus
"Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 825 (E.D. Wis. 1962), affd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th
Cir. 1963).
Ir'he rule was initially enforced in Baker v. Drake, 53 N.Y. 211, 217 (1873), in an action
brought for conversion. Valuation under the New York Rule has been subject to jurisdictional
variation in applying the cover theory. Compare id. with Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446
F.2d 90, 105 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1972).
-129 U.S. 193 (1889). The Court adopted the rule as a compromise between an out-ofpocket rule, which would not adequately compensate a victim of conversion, and an economic
equivalent of rescission, which would be too burdensome on a defendant who might have to wait
several years before the action was tried.
"Id. at 201.
s309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970), modified sub nom. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1972).
3309 F. Supp. at 565.
11446 F.2d at 105.
38ln this respect, the cover theory mirrors the purpose of rescission.
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capital can evaluate the situation in light of the correction of the misstatement, decide that the wisest course is to reinvest, reacquire the
stock within a reasonable period of time after the misstatement is rectified, and thereby take advantage of any subsequent rise in the price of
the stock. On the other hand, an impecunious investor can draw the
same conclusions but may be precluded from enjoying a subsequent rise
in price. To illustrate, if the impecunious plaintiff sold Security Y at ten
dollars per share because of some material misstatement and if the
court, by applying a cover theory test for damages, determines that the
plaintiff should have covered at twenty dollars per share to protect his
interest in Security Y, the plaintiff will recover ten dollars per share.
However, recovery will not permit the plaintiff to repurchase Security
Y if, upon collecting the judgment at the conclusion of protracted litigation, Security Y is selling at thirty dollars per share.
Furthermore, in light of the liberalization of the "in connection
with" clause of Rule lOb-5(c)39 and in light of the uncertainty of the
scienter requirement as an element of a lOb-5 cause of action,"0 the cover
theory may subject a defendant to unwarranted liability.
A number of federal courts have recognized the out-of-pocket
theory as an accurate measure of damages for lOb-5 violations.', The
out-of-pocket theory relieves the court of the speculative task of assessing the seller's intentions regarding the disposition of the securities at
some time subsequent to his actual sale. Likewise, the theory dispenses
with the necessity to determine a reasonable period of time in which the
seller would have, should have, or could have reinvested. More significantly, it places a limit on the liability of the defendant.
Despite these advantages, the out-of-pocket theory minimizes the
deterrent quality of the Securities Exchange Act of 193442 and erodes
the congressional purpose of achieving "a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry. ' 4 3 The out-of-pocket theory is, by
itself, not sufficient to deter fraudulent conduct when the defendant
retains the possibility of considerable gain from his misconduct. A
fraudulent purchase at ten dollars per share of Security Z, which has
an "actual value" of fifteen dollars per share, enables the wrongdoer to
31See note 4 supra.
"Ilt is uncertain whether Rule lOb-5 reaches negligent as well as intentional misrepresentation.
Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions under Rule lob-5, 48 N.C.L. REv. 482, 503 (1970).
"See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), affd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
1215 U.S.C. §§ 78a to hh-I (1970).
3SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
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retain any profit he may have realized as a result of a rise in the market
price above fifteen dollars per share. To allow him to profit by his

wrongdoing offends not only the congressional intent44 in the field of
securities regulation but also basic equity principles.

It seems that the United States Supreme Court was cognizant of
the advantages and disadvantages of the various damage theories when

it made its initial ruling on damages in the Affiliated Ute case. The
Court's measure of damages was the difference between the fair value
of all the seller received and the fair value of what he would have

received on the date of the sale had there been no fraudulent conduct,

5

except that when the defendant received more than the seller's actual

loss, damages are the amount of the defendant's profit."6

In the Affiliated Ute case, the Court basically applied an out-of-

pocket rule in arriving at the appropriate damages.

7

However, the

Court's damage rule is not limited only to this case or to a case with

the same factual pattern. The Court's alternative damage formula encompasses all fact situations in which the defrauded seller can prove a
lOb-5 violation. The rule need not be restricted to face-to-face transac-

tions in insignificant markets; it is especially appropriate for securities
listed on major exchanges, because a fair value is more easily deter-

mined by substantial trading after the missstatement or failure to disclose has been rectified.

By fashioning such a flexible damage rule, the Court has interpreted section 28(a)48 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 broadly
"See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).
4
1The fair value of what the seller would have received is a factual question left to the trial
court. In the Affiliated Ute case, some of the factors involved in the trial court's assessment of
the fair value were the substantial present value and great potential value of the corporate assets,
the improper activities of the defendants, and the excess of sellers over buyers. 92 S. Ct. at 1473.
The discretionary power in assessing damages can be a substantial deterrent to defendant misconduct. In Affiliated Ute, the stock was valued at $1500 per share despite the fact that this figure
almost doubled the highest price at which the stock was traded as a result of the defendants' failure
to disclose.
"This rule is applicable when the defendant's profit is the proximate consequence of the fraud.
Such a formulation involves a constructive trust approach. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 18, § 9.1.
The rule, if applied to "paper profits", would deter fraudulent conduct by assuring the fraudulent
party of the futility of profiting by his fraudulent conduct.
"The fair value of the stock at the time of the sale, determined by the trial court to be $1500,
far exceeded any profit realized by the defendants.
"Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act provides in part: "The rights and remedies provided by
this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or
in equity; but no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this
chapter shall recover . . . a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act
complained of." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970). The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
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enough to include an equitable remedy and thereby to effectuate the
deterrent value of the Act by requiring the wrongdoer to "disgorge his
fraudulent enrichment"; 49 yet, at the same time, the Court's interpretation of section 28(a) is not so broad as to subject defendants, as a group,
to unwarranted liability.
Because of the liberalization of the elements of a lOb-5 cause of
action," the class of potential defendants from whom an injured plaintiff
may recover is broader than the class of defendants from whom an
injured plaintiff may recover in a common law action. Moreover, because of the extremely liberal jurisdiction and venue requirements of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the class of potential defendants in a
lOb-5 action is more accessible than the class of potential defendants in
a common law action. For these reasons, it seems appropriate that the
Court limit the measure of damages in a lOb-5 cause of action. Such a
limitation does not preclude a plaintiff from pursuing an action at law
or in equity if the remedy he seeks is excluded in a lOb-5 action,"'
provided the plaintiff satisfies the more stringent elements of such a
claim.
In Affiliated Ute, the Court has spoken in an area in need of
clarification, and by its ruling has paved the way for uniform, equitable
recovery in lOb-5 actions.
ROBERT F. PRICE
Commerce cast little light on the proper interpretation of "actual damages" under section 28(a)
when it limited comment on the section to the following: "This subsection reserves rights and

remedies existing outside of those provided in this Act, but limits the total amount recoverable to
the amount of actual damages." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1934); 2 A.
BROMBERG, supra note 18, § 9.1.
The case law on the interpretation of section 28(a) is divided. Compare Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718, 748 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (permitting a plaintiff to recover
defendant's profits) and Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968)
(recognizing the suitability of punitive damages for a lOb-5 violation) with Kohler v. Kohler Co.,
208 F. Supp. 808, 825 (E.D. Wis. 1962) (dictum), affd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963) (restricting
damages under section 28(a) to a computation under the federal "out-of-pocket" rule applied in
fraud actions).

Professor Loss contends that section 28(a) "simply precludes a double recovery . . . under
lOb-5 and in common law deceit." 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1474 n.105 (2d ed. 1961).
4

'Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
"See note 4 supra.
51See note 46 supra.

